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by JONATHAN COOK



It is possibly the greatest of American political myths, repeated ad nauseam by presidential candidates in their election campaigns. President Barack Obama has claimed that the United States enjoys a special bond with Israel unlike its relations with any other country. He has called the friendship “unshakeable”, “enduring” and “unique”, “anchored by our common interests and deeply held values”.
His Republican rival, Mitt Romney, has gone further, arguing that there is not “an inch of difference between ourselves and our ally Israel”. A recent Romney election ad, highlighting his summer visit to Israel, extolled the “deep and cherished relationship”.
But, while such pronouncements form the basis of an apparent Washington consensus, the reality is that the cherished friendship is no more than a fairy tale. It has been propagated by politicians to mask the suspicion — and plentiful examples of duplicity and betrayal — that have marked the relationship since Israel’s founding.
Politicians may prefer to express undying love for Israel, and hand over billions of dollars annually in aid, but the US security establishment has — at least, in private — always regarded Israel as an unfaithful partner.
The distrust has been particularly hard to hide in relation to Iran. Israel has been putting relentless pressure on Washington, apparently in the hope of manoeuvring it into supporting or joining an attack on Tehran to stop what Israel claims is an Iranian effort to build a nuclear bomb concealed beneath its civilian energy programme.
While coverage has focused on the personal animosity between Obama and the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the truth is that US officials generally are deeply at odds with Israel on this issue.
The conflict burst into the open this month with reports that the Pentagon had scaled back next month’s joint military exercise, Austere Challenge, with the Israeli military that had been billed as the largest and most significant in the two countries’ history.
The goal of the exercise was to test the readiness of Israel’s missile-defence shield in case of Iranian reprisals — possibly the biggest fear holding Israel back from launching a go-it-alone attack. The Pentagon’s main leverage on Israel is its X-band radar, stationed in Israel but operated exclusively by a US crew, that would provide Israel with early warning of Iranian missiles.
A senior Israeli military official told Time magazine what message the Pentagon’s rethink had conveyed: “Basically what the Americans are saying is, ‘We don’t trust you’.”
But discord between the two “unshakeable allies” is not limited to Iran. Antipathy has been the norm for decades. Over the summer, current and former CIA officials admitted that the US security establishment has always regarded Israel as its number one counter-intelligence threat in the Middle East.
The most infamous spy working on Israel’s behalf was Jonathan Pollard, a naval intelligence officer who passed thousands of classified documents to Israel in the 1980s. Israel’s repeated requests for his release have been a running sore with the Pentagon, not least because defence officials regard promises that Israel would never again operate spies on US soil as insincere.
At least two more spies have been identified in the past few years. In 2008 a former US army engineer, Ben-Ami Kadish, admitted that he had allowed Israeli agents to photograph secret documents about US fighter jets and nuclear weapons in the 1980s. And in 2006 Lawrence Franklin, a US defence official, was convicted of passing classified documents to Israel concerning Iran.
In fact, such betrayals were assumed by Washington from the start of the relationship. In Israel’s early years, a US base in Cyprus monitored Israeli activities; today, Israeli communications are intercepted by a team of Hebrew linguists stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland.
Documents released this month by the Israeli air force archives also reveal that Israel eventually identified mysterious high-altitude planes that overflew its territory throughout the 1950s as American U-2 espionage planes.
In a sign of continuing US caution, Israel has not been included in the coterie of countries with which Washington shares sensitive intelligence. The members of the “Five Eyes” group, consisting of the US, Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, have promised not to spy on each other — a condition Israel would have regularly flouted were it a member.
Indeed, Israel has even stolen the identities of nationals from these countries to assist in Mossad operations. Most notoriously, Israel forged passports to smuggle Israeli agents into Dubai in 2010 to assassinate Hamas leader Mahmoud Al Mabhouh.
Israel is far from a trusted ally in the US “war on terror”. A former intelligence official told the Associated Press in July that Israel ranked lower than Libya in a list of countries helping to fight terrorism compiled by the Bush administration after September 11.
So why all the talk of a special bond if the relationship is characterised by such deep mistrust?
Part of the answer lies in the formidably intimidating tactics of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington. Thomas Friedman, the New York Times columnist, spoke for a growing number of observers last year when he wrote that the US Congress was effectively “bought and paid for” by Israel’s lobbyists.
That power was all too evident last week when the Democratic national convention adopted an amended policy designating Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, in opposition to both international law and the vocal wishes of delegates.
But there is another, less spoken-of reason. Francis Perrin, the head of the French Atomic Agency in the 1950s and 1960s, when France was helping Israel develop a nuclear weapon against the wishes of the US, once observed that the Israeli bomb was really “aimed against the Americans”.
Not because Israel wanted to attack the US, but because it realised that — once it possessed the only nuclear arsenal in the Middle East — the US would rarely risk standing in its way, however much its policies ran counter to US interests.
For that reason, if no other, Israel is determined to stop any rival, including Iran, from getting a nuclear weapon that would end its monopoly.
Jonathan Cook won the Martha Gellhorn Special Prize for Journalism. His latest books are “Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East” (Pluto Press) and “Disappearing Palestine: Israel’s Experiments in Human Despair” (Zed Books). His website is 
www.jkcook.net.












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By Reza Kahlili

Iran’s intelligence ministry is warning the leaders of the Islamic regime that due to deteriorating economic conditions, the possibility of a popular uprising in the coming months is great. The ministry has urged the regime to make appropriate decisions in light of that.

The secret report, according to the Iranian Internet site Kaleme, the official site of the Green protest movement, specifically warned of riots by hungry masses on the outskirts of Iran’s major cities.
This presents a great opportunity for the West, particularly the United States, to end its crisis with Iran – from the clash over Iran’s nuclear program to its hostile relations with Tehran generally. If only the US finally understood that the key to solving the Iran problem is to help Iranians with their aspirations for freedom and democracy.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in a Sept. 4 televised address to the nation, warned that sanctions enforced by the West over Iran’s nuclear program have crippled the country’s oil exports and banking. And he confessed that the sanctions have caused problems for the government to provide basic necessities such as meat and other goods to the people.
“It is an all-out, hidden, heavy war,” Mr. Ahmadinejad said, though he promised that the country will succeed in circumventing the sanctions.
The urgency of Ahmadinejad’s message underscores the increasing anger of many Iranians that the country is being mismanaged, but they are unaware that conditions are going to get much worse. The government wants to prepare them for such a scenario.
The Iranian people, who by the millions came out in 2009 voicing their resentment with the regime and hoping for change, found no support from the West. President Obama may have condemned the regime’s brutal crackdown on protesters, but he turned his back on them when he chose negotiations with Tehran rather than directly supporting the aspirations of a nation.
But it is not too late.
Today, the only viable solution in securing peace and stability in the region is regime change in Iran. To achieve that, the US and other democracies must help the Iranian people – not with arms but with support and technological advancements to inform, unify, and enable the millions who are awaiting American leadership.
By support I mean an all-out effort to help the opposition promote civil disobedience, peaceful protests, and national strikes in Iran. The West should be encouraging defections from the regime, just as it has with Syria, and offering safe harbor. Many officers in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and even diplomats are looking for a way out, only to find no visible support. The West should also support the formation of a government in exile, as many in the opposition are now coming together to create a national council that can guide Iran’s changes from within.
Meanwhile, the regime is launching a national Internet to cut its population off from the rest of the world and to block the social networks that were so widely used during the 2009 uprising. That makes western technical assistance imperative – digital radio broadcasting, satellite phones, and secure “proxy” servers for access to the Internet.
The timing for an Iranian Spring could not be better. The Kaleme website reported that the government’s economic commission has concluded that the country will run out of its foreign currency reserves in the next six months and that inflation plaguing the Iranian currency will see another steep rise. This week the rial hit a record low against the dollar.
Several Iranian parliamentarians in recent days have warned against price increases on common goods and have requested that the government delay its decision to remove consumer subsidies, saying such action would exacerbate the worsening situation. Even the ayatollahs have voiced fears of a backlash by the people.
The regime dreads another uprising such as the one in 2009 in the wake of the fraudulent election of Ahmadinejad. Leaders worry not only about those who resent this regime, who are many, but those who can no longer feed their families. Although such an uprising could see the end of the mullahs’ regime in Iran, the leadership adamantly pursues its nuclear program with the expectation the program will make the regime untouchable in expanding its ideology and power regionally.
In preparation for an uprising, the regime has formed thousands of fast-response units within the Basij paramilitary forces and the Revolutionary Guard to suppress protesters, according to news reports.
It is clear that sanctions are affecting the Iranian economy, but it’s also clear that the regime is determined to move ahead with its nuclear program despite UN resolutions and sanctions. The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency released Aug. 30 indicated an expansion of Iranian enrichment activity and stonewalling of inspections of the site where possible nuclear weapons experiments are said to have taken place.
If the West were to support regime change in Iran, of course Tehran would halt negotiations over its nuclear program. No loss there, as talks have yielded nothing so far. Indeed, the choice now is between external support for regime change from within, or a military strike – most likely by Israel – to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.
With the ayatollahs out, the nuclear-bomb question becomes moot. The US, along with other democracies, must take advantage of the current climate and openly support the Iranian people’s prayers to live free. Washington should not turn its back this time.
Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for a former CIA operative in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and author of the award winning book “A Time to Betray” (Simon & Schuster, 2010). He serves on the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and the advisory board of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI).




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Sarmila Bose

Last month, Al Jazeera published an article entitled Book, film greeted with fury among Bengalis. Here, Sarmila Bose, author of Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, responds to the criticism levelled at her work.
In all the excitement about the “Arab spring” it is instructive to remember the 1971 war in South Asia. Then too there was a military regime in Pakistan, easily identified as the “baddies” – and a popular uprising in its rebellious Eastern province, where Bengali nationalists were reported to be peacefully seeking freedom, democracy and human rights.
When the regime used military force to crush the rebellion in East Pakistan, India intervened like a knight to the rescue, resulting in the defeat of the bad guys, victory for the good guys and the independence of Bangladesh… Or so the story went for forty years. I grew up with it in Calcutta. It was widely repeated in the international press.
Several years ago I decided to chronicle a number of incidents of the 1971 war in-depth. I observed that many Bangladeshis were aggrieved that the world seemed to have forgotten the terrible trauma of the birth of their nation. Given the scale of the suffering, that lack of memory certainly appeared to be unfair, but there did not seem to be many detailed studies of the war – without which the world could not be expected to remember, or understand, what had happened in 1971.
My aim was to record as much as possible of what seemed to be a much-commented-on but poorly documented conflict – and to humanise it, so that the war could be depicted in terms of the people who were caught up in it, and not just faceless statistics. I hoped that the detailed documentation of what happened at the human level on the ground would help to shed some light on the conflict as a whole.
The principal tool of my study was memories. I read all available memoirs and reminiscences, in both English and Bengali. But I also embarked on extensive fieldwork, finding and talking to people who were present at many particular incidents, whether as participants, victims or eye-witnesses. Crucially, I wanted to hear the stories from multiple sources, including people on different sides of the war, so as to get as balanced and well-rounded a reconstruction as possible.
As soon as I started to do systematic research on the 1971 war, I found that there was a problem with the story which I had grown up believing: from the evidence that emanated from the memories of all sides at the ground level, significant parts of the “dominant narrative” seem not to have been true. Many “facts” had been exaggerated, fabricated, distorted or concealed. Many people in responsible positions had repeated unsupported assertions without a thought; some people seemed to know that the nationalist mythologies were false and yet had done nothing to inform the public. I had thought I would be chronicling the details of the story of 1971 with which I had been brought up, but I found instead that there was a different story to be told.
Product of research
My book Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War, the product of several years of fieldwork based research, has just been published (Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press). It focuses on the bitter fratricidal war within the province of East Pakistan over a period of a little more than a year, rather than the open “hot” war between India and Pakistan towards the end. It brings together, for the first time, the memories of dozens of people from each side of the conflict who were present in East Pakistan during the war. It lets the available evidence tell the stories. It has been described as a work that “will set anew the terms of debate” about this war.
Even before anyone has had the chance to read it, Dead Reckoning has been attracting comment, some of it of a nature that according to an observer would make the very reception of my book a subject of “taboo studies”. “Myth-busting” works that undermine nationalist mythology, especially those that have gone unchallenged for several decades, are clearly not to be undertaken by the faint-hearted. The book has received gratifying praise from scholars and journalists who read the advance copies, but the word “courageous” cropped up with ominous frequency in many of the reviews. Some scholars praised my work in private; others told me to prepare for the flak that was bound to follow. One “myth-busting” scholar was glad my book was out at last, as I would now sweep up at the unpopularity stakes and she would get some respite after enduring several years of abuse.
Scholars and investigative journalists have an important role in “busting” politically partisan narratives. And yet, far too often we all fall for the seductive appeal of a simplistic “good versus evil” story, or fail to challenge victors’ histories.
So far the story of valiant rebels fighting oppressive dictators in the so-called “Arab spring” has had one significant blemish – the vicious sexual attack and attempted murder of CBS foreign correspondent Lara Logan by dozens of men celebrating the downfall of Hosni Mubarak in Tahrir Square in Cairo. It initially vanished from the headlines and has still not led to the kind of questioning of the representation of such conflicts that it should have generated. “Tahrir Square” became shorthand for freedom and democracy-loving people rising up against oppressive dictators.
People in other countries started to say they wanted their own “Tahrir Square”. Logan has given a brave and graphic account of what happened to her at the hands of those supposedly celebrating the fall of a dictator and the coming of freedom, democracy and human rights. Her life was saved by burqa-clad Egyptian women and she was rescued by soldiers. Her account endows “Tahrir Square” with an entirely different meaning.
It should caution us against assuming that all those opposing an oppressive regime are champions of non-violence, democracy or human rights. It should alert us to the complexities of political power struggles and civil war, and stop getting carried away by what we imagine is happening, or would like to happen, rather than what the evidence supports.
Such was the impact of the 1971 war on South Asians that the year has transformed into a shorthand for its particular symbolism: 1971, or ekattor, the number 71 in Bengali, has come to stand for a simple equation of a popular nationalist uprising presumed to embody liberal democratic values battling brutal repression by a military dictatorship. But was it really as simple as that? Over time, the victorious Bangladeshi nationalist side’s narrative of Pakistani villainy and Bengali victimhood became entrenched through unquestioned repetition.
The losing side of Pakistani nationalists had its own myth-making, comprising vast Indian plots. Pakistan had been carved out of the British Empire in India as a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims. It was a problematic idea from the start – a large proportion of Muslims chose to remain in secular and pluralistic India, for instance, and its two parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, were separated by a thousand miles of a hostile India. In 1971 the idea of Islam as the basis of nationhood came apart in South Asia along with the country of Pakistan, after a mere 23 years of existence. What went wrong? And what do the memories of those who were there reveal about the reality of that war?
The publication of Dead Reckoning has spoiled the day for those who had been peddling their respective nationalist mythologies undisturbed for so long. Careers have been built – in politics, media, academia and development – on a particular telling of the 1971 war. All the warring parties of 1971 remain relentlessly partisan in recounting the conflict. As the dominant narrative, which has gained currency around the world, is that of the victorious Bangladeshi nationalists and their Indian allies, they stand to lose the most in any unbiased appraisal. Unsurprisingly therefore, the protests from this section are the shrillest.
Mixed reaction
The reaction to the publication of Dead Reckoning by those who feel threatened by it has followed a predictable path. First, there has been an attempt to damn the book before it was even available. Apart from random rants on the internet – which provides opportunity for anyone to rail against anything – reports have been written by people who haven’t read the book, citing other people who also haven’t read the book. The reason for this may be summed up as the well-founded fear of “knowledge is power”.
When people read the book they will be far better informed as to what really happened in 1971. Hence the desperate attempt by those who have been spinning their particular yarns for so long to try to smear the book before anyone gets the chance to read it. A few people also seem to be trying to laud the book before reading it, an equally meaningless exercise. These commentaries are easy to dismiss: clearly, those who haven’t read the book have nothing of value to say about it.
Second, detractors of the book claim that it exonerates the military from atrocities committed in East Pakistan in 1971. In reality the book details over several chapters many cases of atrocities committed by the regime’s forces, so anyone who says it excuses the military’s brutalities is clearly lying. The question is – why are they lying about something that will easily be found out as soon as people start reading the book? The answer to this question is more complex than it might seem. Of course the detractors hope that by making such claims they will stop people from reading the book.
Part of the answer lies also in that the book corrects some of the absurd exaggerations about the army’s actions with which Bangladeshi nationalists had happily embellished their stories of “villainous” Pakistanis for all these years. But an important reason for falsely claiming that the book exonerates the military is to distract attention from the fact that it also chronicles the brutalities by their own side, committed in the name of Bengali nationalism. The nature and scale of atrocities committed by the “nationalist” side had been edited out of the dominant narrative. Its discovery spoils the “villains versus innocents” spin of Bangladeshi nationalist mythology.
A key question about the “controversy” over Dead Reckoning is why this book is stirring such passions when other works do not. One reason for this is that there are precious few studies of the 1971 war based on dispassionate research. This is the first book-length study that reconstructs the violence of the war at the ground-level, utilising multiple memories from all sides of the conflict.
Two eminent US historians, Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, published the only research-based study of the war at the diplomatic and policy level twenty years ago. Their excellent book, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (University of California Press, 1990), challenged the dominant narrative, but their work does not seem to be known among the general public as much as within academia.
However, a crucial reason for the special impact of Dead Reckoning has to do with who the author is. I am a Bengali, from a nationalist family in India. As Indians and Bengalis our sympathies had been firmly with the liberation struggle in Bangladesh in 1971. The dominant narrative of the 1971 war is the story as told by “my side”, as it were. My reporting of what I actually found through my research, rather than unquestioningly repeating the partisan narrative or continuing the conspiracy of silence over uncomfortable truths, is thus taken as a “betrayal” by those who have profited for so long from mythologising the history of 1971.
It is important to note that not all South Asians subscribe to the myth-making. One eminent Indian journalist thought that my “courage, disregard for orthodoxy and meticulous research” in writing Dead Reckoning made me “the enfant terrible of Indian historians”. A senior Bangladeshi scholar has found it “fitting that someone with Sarmila’s links with Bengali nationalism should demonstrate that political values cannot be furthered by distorting history.”
South Asians are prone to conjuring up all manner of conspiracy theories when faced with unpleasant realities, but those looking for one for Dead Reckoning are at a loss, as the only explanation for what it contains is that it reconstructs what really happened on the basis of available evidence.
The process of dismantling entrenched nationalist mythologies can be painful for those who have much vested in them, but the passions stirred by the publication of Dead Reckoning has sparked the debate that the 1971 war badly needed – and set on the right course the discussion of this bitter and brutal fratricidal war that split the only homeland created for Muslims in the modern world.
Sarmila Bose is Senior Research Fellow in the Politics of South Asia at the University of Oxford. She was a journalist in India for many years. She earned her degrees at Bryn Mawr College (History) and Harvard University (MPA and PhD in Political Economy and Government.)
Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War is published by C. Hurst and Co. and Columbia University Press.
Source: Al Jazeera

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By: Inayatullah

Earlier this month, an important regional seminar was held in Lahore to address issues of equity and quality in school education. It was organised by ITA, Idara-e-Taleem-o-Agahi and South Asia Forum for Education Development in collaboration with Education Testing Service USA, DFID, UKAID and Open Society Foundation as a follow-up of the Salzburg meetings.

Following the example of Prathom and ASER Centre (Annual Status of Education Report) in India, ITA has been carrying out annual surveys of school education in Pakistan.
The inaugural session of the seminar was addressed by Rukmini Banerji, Director ASER Centre India. She spoke about the ASER experience in India. She said that 97 percent (gross) of children aged 6 to 14 are enrolled in schools, but 50 percent of them in grade 5 cannot read grade 2 level texts. The data for arithmetic is equally depressing. The challenge in India, according to her, is how to effectively improve learning outcomes.
In Pakistan, the conditions are no better, if not worse. The net enrolment at the primary level is around 60 percent. Attendance of teachers and students in schools leaves much to be desired. According to the Pakistan Task Force report released last year, on a given day 15 to 20 percent of public sector teachers are found absent leaving children for one day a week, without teaching. It is estimated that out of 365 days of the year in Pakistan, public schools teaching takes place only on 120 days or so – the rest of the days, the schools are either closed or remain busy in other activities; teachers have to attend to such non-teaching duties as election related assignments.
In Pakistan today, about eight million children are out of school at the primary level and according to an estimate, the number of 5-16 years old out of school is 20 million. And 40 percent of those who do join school at the age of 5, dropout during the first two years.
In a paper presented at the ASER seminar, Dr Faisal Bari and Ms Nargis Sultana drew attention to the fragmentation of education in Pakistan. To quote: “Our education system is divided on lines of geography, class, income/wealth, medium of instruction, cost, syllabi, curricula and gender and these differences manifest themselves in differentials in access, dropouts and in the quality of education that is imparted. And existing differences in educational provision will, inevitably, create even bigger differences in the future. If our objective is to educate all children, and at least to a minimum standard, so that they can have some equality of opportunity, or at least a bigger set of opportunities available to each of them, we need to challenge the existing differences and divisions.”
Ms Banerji in her talk mentioned some remedial steps to improve learning outcomes. These included organising summer camps for laggard students, regrouping of students in the classes and reviewing the text books which she found a little too difficult to read and comprehend. She also recommended child-friendly practices in the classrooms and outside. And better teacher-training programmes.
India has already promulgated a Right to Education Legislation and after the 18th Amendment, Pakistan has yet to do so. Some of the recommendations made on the basis of the ASER India findings 2011 are:
i India has made impressive progress in enrolment. Now is the time to turn from inputs and access, and focus on the challenge of how to improve quality.
i Learning outcomes must move to centre stage.
i Large-scale corrective action to build the basic skills of reading arithmetic is urgently required.
i There are real challenges in Indian classrooms. These include diverse age groups, wide variations in ability and multiple classes sitting together. Teachers need to be equipped in a practical way to be able to teach effectively under these circumstances.
Dr Iffat Shah, who summed up the findings of the Lahore ASER seminar, made in this connection, a few thought-provoking observations: “Teacher quality is fundamentally important to student learning – although we do need to remember that the teacher is not the only factor that affects learning. Teacher quality seems to be most frequently measured in terms of academic credentials. But there is little or no evidence that higher credentials or pre-service training lead to better quality of teaching. We also heard some evidence suggesting that teachers are struggling and demotivated. However, there is some evidence that school-based professional development can prepare better teachers, as assessed by their students’ learning. We need to know far more about teacher educators and teacher education colleges. A variety of models of teacher education was presented. It will be important to assess the impact of these teacher training or professional development programmes on teacher practice and student outcomes. If there is no positive effect on teaching quality and student learning, then it will be a wasted effort. It was claimed that finding out about impact may be expensive, but I submit that not knowing will be far more expensive.”
More wise words came from Zubaida Mustafa, Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, Ahsan Iqbal, Kasim Kasuri and Ali Moeen Nawazish. Hoodbhoy emphasised a thorough review of the existing out-dated educational system. He was critical of the exam-based learning, which rests on memorising and not “internalising” knowledge. Kasuri said that schools were not relying on real life skills, and that teacher training only improved “professional practices”, but failed to improve the learning outcome of a child. There was need for relating it to school-based monitoring. Ahsan Iqbal remarked that the problem lay with the insensitivity of the ruling elite towards education. Quality teachers were needed to impart knowledge relevant to changing global requirements. He pleaded for enhanced allocations for education and standard curriculum designed by the federal government. Zubaida Mustafa dilated on the plight of the poor children and observed that when children are undernourished and stunted, and have not been exposed to a healthy and positive social environment that encourages mental and cognitive stimulation, they will not have the capacity to benefit optimally from good pedagogy and excellent textbooks. She advocated stringent social controls on the private sector, not by pulling them back, but by encouraging them to take the weaker section of the society along with them.
The Education For All targets and the Millennium Development Goals to which Pakistan is committed will remain a distant dream, unless education is given the highest priority and urgent steps are taken to upgrade and modernise it.
There is much to learn by our governments and the private sector from the wisdom spelt out in the ASER’s seminar briefly highlighted in this column.
As far back as 1947, in his message to the All Pakistan Education Conference, Quaid-i-Azam had warned: “The future of our state will and must greatly depend on the type of the education and the way in which we bring up our children as the future servants of Pakistan.” We still are waiting for the emergence of political will from our rulers in this benighted country.
The writer is an ex-federal secretary and ambassador, and political and international relations analyst.

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By Sheeba Hasan

The wedding of Shoaib Malik and Sania Mirza had recently brought the subject of Indo-Pak marriages, and its related logistical troubles, into focus; but it’s an issue that has been relevant to many for decades. The 1947 partition of the Indian sub-continent divided thousands of families, including my own. My father’s five brothers and two sisters migrated to Pakistan in the subsequent years. My father, a die-hard Indian and an equally staunch secularist, chose to stay in India. He was a celebrated sportsman of his time, and only had good things to say about his country and its people, despite not always agreeing with the policies of the government. From him, early in life, I acquired the wisdom of viewing the state and society separately. I may not like a country’s foreign policy or certain players in its establishment, but this does not necessarily make that nation or its population my enemy or hate-worthy.
Some major twists in destiny later, I found myself on the other side of the border. A little before my 20th birthday, I had to give up my blue Indian passport for the Pakistani green. At that time, the decision was dictated purely by circumstances, not choice. Subsequently, travel to India became my worst nightmare. Visiting my father and brothers was reduced to an annual treat due to cumbersome visa formalities. Though my experiences with the Indian embassies and consulates have always been pleasant (and I am deeply grateful for their helpfulness), the processes nevertheless have been tedious. Limited entry and exit points in India; three-city visit restrictions; police reporting and filling a special form for Pakistan nationals at the airport (while holding everyone up in the queue behind you) have all posed inconveniences at different times.
My worst experience of the visa restrictions was not being able to reach my dying father in time because I had to waste precious hours on getting multiple copies of the lengthy forms and documents in order, without which a visa application cannot be submitted. And, of course, I couldn’t fly directly to Kolkata because travelling by air I could only enter India through Delhi or Mumbai.
Meanwhile, many years and some more twists in destiny later, I now have an Indian husband and two children who have blue passports too. It has been over 20 years since I acquired citizenship of Pakistan. Trips to India are more frequent; but through it all the visa-travel formalities have remained unchanged. So, quite understandably, I have eagerly awaited the signing of the Indo-Pak visa liberalisation agreement. I was not alone. Several relatives and friends have had cross-border marriages and we often bond over our experiences of visa-related misery, anger, anxiety, hopelessness, helplessness, hope and happiness.
But right now I feel sheer joy; and relief. The new visa agreement, formalised earlier this month, promises to ease our travel troubles. As per the agreement, as the spouse of an Indian national I am now entitled to a two-year multiple visa to India. I can also visit more cities.
I am also happy that the Pakistan government is taking the initiative to improve ties with India; and, of course, with India’s response to it. I can’t agree more with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, when she says that the younger generations do not carry the baggage of history. As one of probably few people from my generation who has lived on either side of the border, both as an Indian and a Pakistani, I know many others who share this sentiment.
There are cynics and hardliners in both India and Pakistan who think and want otherwise, but fortunately I don’t know any of them. Though a Pakistani, my Facebook friends list has more Indians than Pakistanis, and at a people-to-people level, nationality has never been an issue among us. I was made to feel most welcome and comfortable when I joined a prestigious college in Lahore, days after migrating from India. The questions about India were positive; and there was immense warmth. I feel the same warmth when I now connect with my Indian friends or talk to random strangers during my visits to India. There’s curiosity about Pakistan, and sometimes a difference of opinion or even a heated argument, but I have never experienced animosity or hostility. Surely a lot of us do trust and respect each other. We all want to be friends and move forward in the best manner possible, without history as a hurdle. It’s good for regional stability, for the economies and internal peace of Pakistan and India, and, of course, for thousands of people like me who genuinely wish well for both the countries.
I am often asked who I support during the India-Pakistan cricket match? Putting it simply, I am a Pakistani with a soft corner for India.
Sheeba Hasan is a writer based in Dubai.